

DNS Pentesting

Sunny Neo

Santosh Ananthakrishnan

Recap

- DNS can be used as a communication channel - not just for name resolution
- DNS TXT record based XSS attack
- Building tools that use this channel for stealthy pentesting!



Our Work

- UDP Hole Punching with DNS
- Staging exploit over DNS
- DNS performance as a channel

UDP Hole Punching

- A common technique for 2 clients to establish connection behind NAT
- A common misconception that clients behind NAT are not able to provide services without port forwarding

NAT “Security Feature”



Client B
wants to connect
to Client A
Streaming Service
via
199.20.199.10:
3000

NAT Router 1
Public IP: 10.20.99.11

Private IP: 192.168.1.1
/24


NO.
NAT Router 2
Public IP: 199.20.199.10

Private IP: 192.168.1.1/24


No port forwarding setup

Client A
Running
Streaming
service on
UDP port
3000


What if



What if



What if



4. Client B connects to 199.20.199.10: 5435
for streaming service

Client A happens to run
streaming service on port
3000!


IP: 202.201.201.201


Why this works

- Legitimate DNS query and response
- Most NAT does not implement IP Address/Port Restriction for mapping
- Could this be used for P2P Malware?

Stagers

- Small exploits are typically *inline* - the payload is delivered with the exploit as shellcode
- Tools that abstract out the payload delivery channel from the payload itself are called stagers





Staging over DNS

- The stager stealthily polls an A-server controlled by the CNC
- When a stage is ready, the A-server responds with the number of chunks to fetch encoded in the last two bytes of the response IP address
- 141.232.01.10 = 266 chunks

Staging over DNS

- The stager then fetches these chunks at random, also over DNS
- <encoded req for chunk N>.evildom.com
- The response includes several resource records (RRs)
- Each RR corresponds to an encoded block of bytes

Staging over DNS

- Subsequent requests can be made far apart
- days or more!
- Eventually re-assemble and execute payload
- Use dynamic DNS providers for even more indirection

DEMO

Potential Problems

- Analysis of DNS requests
 - CDNs and other abusive services have *huge* volume
 - The stager can slow down queries arbitrarily
- Slow Transfer Rate
 - This is obviously only for cases where there are no other channels, or when no direct TCP connections are to be made to the CnC, tradeoff.

Performance

- How good is DNS as a channel, really?

	Receiver				
	NJ 1	NJ 2	LA	NLD	JPN
NJ 1	-	2981/2981	2888/2889	2964/2964	3053/3054
NJ 2	3016/3016	-	3100/3101	2734/2735	3054/3054
LA	2901/2941	2932/2975	-	2938/2942	2712/2712
NLD	3038/3038	2771/2772	2724/2724	-	2791/2791
JPN	2551/2552	2886/2886	2836/2838	2887/2887	-

UDP Reliability (Source: <http://openmymind.net/How-Unreliable-Is-UDP/>)

References

[1]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UDP_hole_punching

[2]<http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/udp-hole-punching/>